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Foreword 
 
This brief report was prepared within the framework of the extensive research project of 
the Institute of Policy Studies, supported by the Local Governments Initiative (LGI) of 
the Open Society Institute and the Citizens Advocate! Program funded by the US 
Agency for International Development.  
Here are presented some findings related to political profiles of the Georgia’s electorate 
made during the first two rounds of the panel survey, which was carried out in October-
November 2002 and June 2003 on most of the territory of Georgia, with exception of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (we concentrate here mostly on the June 2003 results, 
bringing the 2002 data mainly for comparison to illustrate change). The total of 1100 
persons have been interviewed, selected so as to take into account demographic variables 
such as urban/rural settlement type as well as gender and age groups, considered to be a 
representative sample of the Georgia’s population.   
While two authors, Nana Sumbadze and George Tarkhan-Mouravi, actually wrote this 
report, many other persons contributed to actual research and the fieldwork, preparation 
of the questionnaire, interviewing respondents, and processing the results. We would like 
to acknowledge the especially valuable contribution and support provided by IPS 
research assistants – Ana Kitiashvili and Ekaterine Pirtskhalava, to whom we extend our 
sincere gratitude. While interviewers involved in the fieldwork are too numerous to be 
listed here, all of them deserve our gratitude as well. Tinatin Eristavi did excellent job of 
entering complicated statistical data.  
While this report reflects various contributions to the survey, the authors are fully 
responsible for all its drawbacks and the mistakes.  
  
INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge and understanding of popular attitudes, behaviour patterns, perceptions, understandings and aspirations 
of the population is crucial for effective public policy planning, which should be necessarily based on reliable and 
objective data. However, despite such importance of the issue, it is difficult to find any information based on regular 
surveys of the Georgia’s population. Deficiency of information generated by reliable and regular inquiries of 
Georgian citizens is felt and proclaimed by scholars, policy and decision-makers, and different agencies alike. 
Especially meagre is the information on different regions of Georgia, while the processes in the capital Tbilisi are 
more in the focus of attention. Absence of systematic studies does not permit to monitor dynamics of societal 
changes in response to changes in the environment and to relate such changes to specific policies or decisions. Only 
diachronic perspective poses possibility to identify reasons for the observed behaviour and, when change is needed, 
to work out an effective policy. Regular studies are necessary for the study of the dynamics of changes and their 
monitoring. Equally necessary is the measurement of the reaction of the population to the changes that take place in 
the environment, connection of these changes to the concrete policies and decisions.  
Accordingly, the main goal of the panel survey carried out by the Institute for Policy Studies is the study of the 
public opinion, perceptions and patterns of behaviour of population, and to provide decision-makers and policy 
designers with the information about how the population reacts to important events and policies. The survey is aimed 
at gathering, analysing and making accessible the information on public opinion, perceptions, preferences and 
behaviour patterns of the population of Georgia. The data obtained through the survey is connected with the most 
important events of the country as identified by analysis of media. Recently many surveys have been carried out with 
the main goal to obtain ratings of the political parties and their leaders in the anticipation of forthcoming 
parliamentary elections. Our objective is more general and is targeted at the study of the characteristics that change 
more slowly and depend less on the immediate political changes. 
The questions in the survey refer to the structure of the family of respondents, their economic status, assistant 
received and provided, employment status. In general the study served the purpose to study: the estimations that 
population make on  issues of political,  economic, public  and cultural life: identification of  the main problems that 
the country faces; foreign orientation of the country; attitudes towards other countries and international 
organizations; democracy and the rule of law; attitude towards the payment of taxes; tolerance towards different 
ethnic and religious groups; attitudes toward a number of economic and social policies, trust towards different 
branches of the government; appraisal of political parties and their leaders; estimation of the quality, equality and 
availability of social services; availability and  trust towards different  media sources. 
 
The sample 
The first wave of the panel survey was carried out in the period of October-November 2002 and the second in June 
2003, in 9 regions of Georgia, Ajara, and in the capital Tbilisi, including both rural areas, 58 settlements and the 
following 21 towns: Abasha, Akhalkalaki, Akhaltsikhe, Akhmeta, Ambrolauri, Batumi, Bolnisi, Borjomi, Chiatura, 
Gori, Khashuri, Kutaisi, Lanchkhuti, Marneuli, Mtskheta, Rustavi, Tbilisi, Telavi, Tsageri,  Zestaphoni, Zugdidi. The 
total of 1100 persons were interviewed, respondents were selected to correspond to the distribution of the population 
according to the settlement type, gender and age, so as to be a representative sample of the Georgia’s population.  
About 57% of selected respondents were living in urban and 43% - in rural setting, among them c. 45% were males 
and 55% females, divided into five age groups (17-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 65+). 32.1% of respondents considered 
themselves to be poor, while 67.9% claimed to be either wealthy or of medium condition, further designated as “non-
poor”. 
Almost a half of respondents (46.2%) are university students or have university degree (25.6% of rural and 61.4% of 
urban population), 27.2% have tertiary – high school (41.3% of rural and 16.8% of urban population), 21.6% has 
vocational (25.6% of rural and 18.7% of urban population), 4.9% has incomplete school education (5.8% of rural and 
2.7% of urban population), and 0.9% have undergone only 4 classes of primary schooling (1.7% of rural and 0.3% of 
urban population).  The level of education of the urban, non-poor and young respondents is higher than of rural, poor 
and older ones. 
In many areas covered by the survey, the difference in the level of education between the rural and urban population 
is statistically significant, as is significant the statistical difference between the poor and the non-poor (by self-
assessment), and between the age groups.  
Table 1 
Age and gender structure of respondents in the June 2003 survey 
 Age group Males % Females 
% 
Total share 
of the  age 
group  % 
Share of 
males in the 
age group % 
Share of 
females in the 
age group % 
Total  
% 
1 17-24 16.4 11.2 13.6 55.0 45.0 100 
2 25-34 22.6 15.9 18.9 54.3 45.7 100 
3 35-44 19.2 21.4 20.4 42.9 57.1 100 
4 45-54 14 17.2 15.7 40.5 59.5 100 
5 55-64 11.6 15.2 13.5 38.9 61.1 100 
6 65 and more 16.4 17.8 17.8 41.8 58.2 100 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
  
In general, 64.4% of respondents were married, 23.1% have never been married, 9.8% were widowed and 2.7% - 
divorced. 72.7% of respondents reported from 1 to 7 children, with the mean value of 1.6. On average rural 
respondents have more children (M=1.8), than the urban respondents (M=1.4). Besides that families are bigger in 
villages and comprise on average of 4.8 persons, while in towns families on average have 4.1 members. The majority 
of respondents (91.7%) are ethnic Georgians, 3.1% are Armenians, 2.8% are Azeri and 2.4% are of other ethnicity. 
93.9% have been interviewed in Georgian, 4.8% in Russian, 0.9% in Azeri and 0.5% in Armenian. 45.9% estimated 
their health as neither good nor bad, 34.5% as good, and 19.6% as bad. The rural and urban population did not differ 
in regard to the estimation of health. The difference in regard to health was significant between the poor and non-
poor. Much bigger share of the poor - 33%, than the non-poor - 13.5%, reported poor health status. It is not at all 
surprising that with the age increases the share of the people who have health concerns (such is 3.9% of 17-34 years 
olds, 19.8% of 35-64 years olds and 48% of the senior, more than 64 years olds respondents). 
 
MAIN RESULTS  
Below are presented the data concerning mainly politics and politicians, as such data acquire special interest in the 
period around the elections.  It should be noted that the structural changes in the composition of political forces that 
took place since June 2003 should have had significant impact on the ratings of specific parties and their leaders, but 
would however have much lesser effect upon the social profiles and the value system of their respective supporters. 
Still, the personalities of leading political figures representing each party continue to stay much more important than 
any party programmes are Hence, ratings of the leading political figures by their popularity and the trust towards 
them and as well as the evaluation of their political perspectives, acquire special importance for understanding 
political processes. 
 
Who is liked by whom: general rating of political leaders 
The rating of political figures is a popular topic, various ratings and polling activities are particularly frequent before 
the elections. However, apart from rating the lists of names, it is important to know what are the factors that 
determine choices. In the survey, respondents were asked to choose from the listed eight personal qualities two, 
which they considered as the most important for evaluation of politicians. It is worth noting than against the 
background of overwhelming mistrust and corruption, honesty became the leader among such qualities, the most 
valued as most probably the scarcest (it was chosen by 42.4% of respondents, i.e. about by two and a half times more 
than those who choose the second feature - managerial skills and three times more than the third one – record of past 
achievements). At the same time concern may be caused by modest importance ascribed by respondents to the 
attractiveness of party programmes. 
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Figure 1 
The importance of the features of politicians for their evaluation 
 
Keeping such preferences in mind, it is particularly interesting to look at the ranking (according to their being liked) 
of individual politicians, especially in dynamics comparing of the June 2003 ratings with those obtained in 
November 20021. 
 
Table 2 
Attitude of respondents towards leading Georgian politicians, June 2003 
(Excluding respondents who had not expressed their attitude) 
Rank Politician Liked  by % Indifferent  % Disliked by % Total % 
1 Nino Burjanadze 60.7 25.9 13.3 100 
2 Gogi Topadze 49.3 33.6 17.1 100 
3 Shalva Natelashvili 47.1 30.2 22.7 100 
4 Mikheil Saakashvili 35.7 34 30.3 100 
5 Levan Gachechiladze 34.3 40.8 24.9 100 
6 Jumber Patiashvili 32.6 37.8 29.6 100 
7 Aslan Abashidze 28.7 35 36.3 100 
8 Guram Sharadze 25.5 40.6 34 100 
9 David Gamkrelidze  24.8 45.1 30.2 100 
10 Irakli Batiashvili 22.4 45.2 32.4 100 
11 Mikheil Machavariani 21.9 45.1 33 100 
12 Giorgi Baramidze 21.3 47.3 31.5 100 
13 Temur Shashiashvili 21.1 36.4 42.5 100 
14 Zurab Zhvania 19.6 38.9 41.5 100 
15 Akaki Asatiani 15.2 47.2 37.6 100 
16 Vazha Lordkipanidze 14.6 43.4 42 100 
17 Eduard Shevardnadze 13.6 28.8 57.6 100 
18 Vakhtang Rcheulishvili 13.5 28.4 58.1 100 
19 Avtandil Jorbenadze 12.2 28.1 59.7 100 
20 Irina Sarishvili 10.5 35.2 54.3 100 
21 Akaki  Zoidze 8.8 39.7 51.5 100 
22 Igor Giorgadze 7.9 28.1 64 100 
23 Vitali Khazaradze 3.5 25.4 71 100 
 
                                                 
1 In November 2002 respondents also evaluated politicians, but at that time the list consisted of 16 persons. One person, namely 
Zviad Dzidziguri, had been removed from that list due to the decrease of his political significance. Instead, a few other names 
had been added, including the incumbent President, Eduard Shevardnadze. 
 
Among those respondents who know these politicians (party leaders were known by practically all the respondents), 
the most popular are Nino Burjanadze (60.7%), Gogi Topadze (49.3%) and Shalva Natelashvili (47.1%). The least 
liked are: Vitali Khazaradze (71%), Igor Giorgadze (64%) and Avtandil Jorbenadze (59.7%). Respondents were the 
most indifferent towards Giorgi Baramidze (47.3%), Akaki Asatiani (47.2%) and Irakli Batiashvili (45.2%). 
As is seen from the Table 2, since November 2002, the popularity of Nino Burjanadze, Mikheil Saakashvili, Shalva 
Natelashvili and David Gamkrelidze had significantly increased. Instead, the liking of Vakhtang Rcheulishvili, Irine 
Sarishvili, Jumber Patiashvili and Vazha Lordkipanidze had fallen to significant extent. 
 
Table 3 
Comparison of the support of politicians in November 2002 and June 2003 
 Politician November June Difference 
1 Nino Burjanadze 41.6 60.7 19.1* 
2 Gogi Topadze 49.4 49.4 0 
3 Shalva Natelashvili 41.2 47.1 5.9* 
4 Mikhail Saakashvili 28.5 35.7 7.2* 
5 Levan Gachechiladze 35.7 34.3 1.4 
6 Jumber Patiashvili 39 32.6 6.4 
7 Aslan Abashidze 26.6 28.7 2.1* 
8 David Gamkrelidze 20.3 24.8 4.5* 
9 Zurab Zhvania 16.6 19.6 3* 
10 Akaki Asatiani 18.2 15.2 3 
11 Vazha Lordkipanidze 18.5 14.6 3.9 
12 Vakhtang Rcheulishvili 25.9 13.5 12.4 
13 Avtandil Jorbenadze 14.7 12.2 2.5 
14 Irina Sarishvili 17.5 10.5 7 
15 Igor Giorgadze 11.3 7.9 3.4 
*In June 2003 support was higher 
 
Profiles of supporters: who supports whom 
 
It is very interesting to reveal the social profiles of those respondents who support this or that politician, i.e. what is 
the demographic and economic status of a supporter, place of residence or general political orientation.  
 
Geography of support 
It is quite natural that the liking of a politician and the respective political support have definite geographical 
dimension. So, some politicians are more liked in Imereti, others are more liked in Kakheti. Political taste varies also 
across the settlement type, i.e. rural vs. urban. 
 
Table 4 
The liking of politicians across the regions, June 2003,  in % 
Poilitician Tbilisi Ajara Guria Racha Samegrelo-
Svaneti 
Imereti Kakheti Mtskheta-
Mtianeti 
Samtskhe-
Javakheti 
Kvemo 
Kartli 
Shida 
Kartli 
Burjanadze 69.2 81 52 28 59.2 52.3 53.5 60 66.7 53.3 69.4 
Abashidze 19.5 85.2 10.9 2 46.9 22.6 12.8 20.8 44.2 23.3 33.7 
Gamkrelidze 23.9 21.9 15 16 16.9 23.6 20.6 38.2 58.8 22.2 35.2 
Topadze 45.1 64 47.8 60 31.9 41.1 44.4 39.6 84.2 58.1 59.6 
Zhvania 28.5 27.8 13.6 14 9.2 8.7 18.8 14.6 41.3 10.3 24.5 
Natelashvili 45.1 50 33.3 32 42.7 30.5 63.1 75.5 60.5 48.2 59.8 
Patiashvili 28.5 50 24.4 6 43.3 23.4 21.7 46.9 47.7 34.9 42.9 
Saakashvili 31.3 58.2 15.2 18 30.6 29 47.1 44.9 59.5 26.1 48.5 
  
As it appears, certain politicians are particularly popular, in relative terms, in certain regions: 
Nino Burjanadze in Ajara, Tbilisi and Shida Kartli 
Aslan Abashidze in Ajara, Shida Kartli and Samtske-Javakheti 
David Gamkrelidze in Samtskhe-Javakheti, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, and Shida Kartli 
Gogi Topadze in Samtskhe-javakheti, Ajara and Racha 
Zurab Zhvania in Samtskhe-Javakheti, Tbilisi and Ajara 
Shalva Natelashvili in Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Kakheti and Samtskhe-Javakheti 
Jumber Patiashvili in Ajara, Samtskhe-Javakheti and Mtskheta-Mtianeti 
Mikheil Saakashvili in Samtskhe-javakheti, Ajara and Shida Kartli 
If the viewpoint is reversed, a look at political preferences from the regional perspective would demonstrate that the 
following politicians are best liked in respective regions: 
Tbilisi - Burjanadze, Topadze and Natelashvili 
Ajara - Abashidze, Burjanadze and Saakashvili 
Guria - Burjanadze, Topadze and Natelashvili 
Racha - Topadze, Natelashvili and Burjanadze 
Samegrelo - Zemo Svaneti – Burjanadze, Patiashvili and Natelashvili 
Imereti – Burjanadze, Topadze and Natelashvili 
Kakheti – Natelashvili, Burjanadze and Topadze 
Mtskheta-Mtianeti – Natelashvili, Burjanadze and Patiashvili 
Samtskhe-Javakheti – Topadze, Burjanadze and Natelashvili 
Kvemo Kartli – Topadze, Burjanadze and Natelashvili 
Shida Kartli – Burjanadze, Natelashvili and Topadze 
 
As already noted above, there is difference in popularity found not only between the regions, but also depending on  
the settlement type. Among the supporters of Zhvania, Burjanadze and Topadze there is much higher proportion of 
urbanites, while rural respondents expressed more support toward Patiashvili, Abashidze and Saakashvili. 
 
Table 5 
Liking of politicians among the urban and rural dwellers 
 Politician Urban % Rural % Total % 
1 Burjanadze N=637 59.3 40.7 100 
2 Abashidze N=295 50.5 49.5 100 
3 Gamkrelidze  N=228 56.3 43.7 100 
4 Topadze  N=497 59.8 40.2 100 
5 Zhvania N=203 68 32 100 
6 Natelashvili N=479 52.8 47.2 100 
7 Patiashvili N=334 50.3 49.7 100 
8 Saakashvili   N=368 51.9 48.1 100 
 
Generally the difference in preferences between the rural and urban population in regard to their political orientation 
is quite interesting and sometimes unexpected. So, the rural respondents paid more attention to political programme 
(27.9% compared to 21.9% of urbanites) and the past achievements (43.5% among rural and 41.7% among urban 
population). For urbanites more important is the overall attitude towards the leader (7.7% among the urban and 7.2% 
among the rural population) and his/her eloquence in public speeches (6.6% of urban and 4.9% of rural population). 
Similar differences between urban and rural respondents have been revealed also in regards to various orientations 
and attitudes. So, the bigger share of urban population (32.8%) compared to rural (22.8%) support Georgia leaving 
the Commonwealth of Independent Countries (CIS).  More urbanites  (67.2% as compared to 58.2% of rural 
respondents) support as well the closure of Russian military bases in Georgia. The rural population is somewhat more 
optimistic towards the resolution of ethnic conflicts - 78.2% of rural, compared to 66.6% of urban respondents, 
thinks it is possible to solve the conflict with South Ossetia, while in the case of Abkhazia such opinion is expressed 
by 75.9% rural and 64.8% urban respondents. At the same time, urban respondents tend to be more radical in 
thinking that the force can be used for resolving the conflicts. 
 
Social and  demographic profile of supporters  
Statistical profiles of the supporters of various politicians differ in many respects. Especially interesting is the impact 
of such factors as education, gender and age.  
Burjanadze, Abashidze and Patiashvili are more popular among women, while men prevail among the supporters of 
Gamkrelidze, Natelashvili and Topadze. 
 
Table 5 
Liking of politicians vs. respondents’ gender 
 Politician Male % Female % Total  % 
1 Burjanadze     N=637 42.2 57.8 100 
2 Abashidze      N=296 42.2 57.8 100 
3 Gamkrelidze  N=229 48.5 51.5 100 
4 Topadze       N=497 46.5 53.5 100 
5 Zhvania       N=203 42.9 57.1 100 
6 Natelashvili N=479 46.8 53.2 100 
7 Patiashvili   N=334 42.2 57.8 100 
8 Saakashvili  N=368 43.2 56.8 100 
 
While gender is an important factor, age paradoxically enough has much more limited influence upon political taste. 
This observation contradicts the expected difference between generations, being correlated with other important 
factors such as education level, and it seems various factors are pushing the situation in different directions, leading 
to eventual balance. 
 
Table 6 
Liking of politicians and respondents age 
 Politician 18-34 years olds 
% 
35-64 years olds % 65 and more 
years olds % 
Total 
% 
1 Burjanadze      N=636 30.2 50.0 19.8 100 
2 Abashidze       N=296 34.1 46.6 19.3 100 
3 Gamkrekidze  N=229 31.4 52.4 16.2 100 
4 Topadze         N=497 33 48.9 18.1 100 
5 Zhvania         N=203 27.6 52.7 19.7 100 
6 Natelashvili  N=478 27.2 52.9 19.9 100 
7 Patiashvili    N=333 23.7 51.4 24.9 100 
8 Saakashvili  N=367 29.4 50.4 20.2 100 
 
Indeed, as generations differ by educational level, it is interesting to observe the influence of education on political 
taste. The proportion of people with university education is the highest among the supporters of Zhvania, Topadze 
and Gamkrelidze and is the lowest among the supporters of Patiashvili, Saakashvili and Abashidze. 
 
Table 7 
Liking of politicians and the education of respondents 
 Politician Primary % High school / 
Vocational % 
University-
graduates/ 
unfinished % 
Total 
% 
1 Burjanadze    
N=636 
4.4 50.0 45.6 100 
2 Abashidze      
N=295 
7.1 53.6 39.3 100 
3 Gamkrelidze  
N=228 
4.4 48.7 46.9 100 
4 Topadze       N=495 3.8 48.9 47.3 100 
5 Zhvania       N=203 4.4 48.8 46.8 100 
6 Natelashvili N=477 4.4 55.1 40.5 100 
7 Patiashvili   N=333 5.1 58.8 36.0 100 
8 Saakashvili  N=367 6.0 56.4 37.6 100 
 
Economic dimension 
Economic status of respondents obviously influences political choice, as is demonstrated in the Table 8. Theoretically 
the easiest way of describing economic status of a respondent is by evaluating his/her monthly income. However, 
respondents seldom give accurate answers when asked about their total monthly income, which may contain a very 
significant in-kind component, is often irregular and in any case its reported amount is rarely fully trustworthy. 
Nevertheless, such data is still useful for comparisons, and the overall picture is quite eloquent. According to the 
family incomes in May 2003, the proportion of families with the lowest income was highest among the supporters of 
Patiashvili, Natelashvili and Abashidze. The proportion of respondents with the highest income was concentrated 
among the supporters of Burjanadze, Zhvania and Saakashvili. 
Table 8 
Liking of politicians and the family income in May 
 Politician 100-300 GEL % 300-700 GEL 
% 
700 and more 
GEL % 
Total  % 
1 Burjanadze                 N=634 86.6 10.1 3.3 100 
2 Abashidze                 N=295 89.5 9.8 1.7 100 
3 Gamkrelidze            N=229 82.5 15.8 1.7 100 
4 Topadze                  N=496 86.7 11.7 1.6 100 
5 Zhvania                   N=202 85.1 12.4 2.5 100 
6 Natelashvili            N=478 90.8 8.6 0.6 100 
7 Patiashvili              N=333 93.1 6.3 0.6 100 
8 Saakashvili             N=367 88.5 9.0 2.5 100 
 
Another characteristic factor influencing political choice is estimation by respondents themselves both of their 
present economic status and of its dynamic. Here we have a slightly different picture, although general trends are 
similar. Natelashvili, Patiashvili and Burjanadze have the highest proportion of those respondents who described 
their families “poor”, while the biggest proportion of “non-poor” can be found among the supporters of Abashidze, 
Topadze and Gamkrelidze. 
 
Table 9 
Liking of politicians vs. economic status of respondents (according to self-assessment) 
N Politician Poor % Non-poor % Total % 
1 Burjanadze              N=633 32.4 67.6 100 
2 Abashidze              N=293 29.4 70.6 100 
3 Gamkrelidze         N=227 31.3 68.7 100 
4 Topadze                N=496 30.8 69.2 100 
5 Zhvania                N=201 31.8 68.2 100 
6 Natelashvili         N=478 37.9 62.1 100 
7 Patiashvili           N=333 36.9 63.1 100 
8 Saakashvili          N=366 31.4 68.6 100 
 
At the same time, the proportion of the respondents who have reported that the economic condition of their families 
had improved during the past five years is the highest among the supporters of Zhvania, Abashidze and Topadze.  
Those, whose economic conditions declined, prevail among the supporters of Patiashvili, Natelashvili and 
Gamkrelidze. 
 
Table 10 
Liking of politicians vs. change in economic conditions of families during past 5 years  
N Politician Improved % Did not change 
% 
Deteriorated 
% 
Total % 
1 Burjanadze N=631 25.4 42.9 31.7 100 
2 Abashidze N=291 27.5 39.5 33.0 100 
3 Gamkrelidze N=225 19.1 47.6 33.3 100 
4 Topadze N=494 26.3 41.1 32.6 100 
5 Zhvania  N=202 29.2 39.1 31.7 100 
6 Natelashvili  N=474 21.7 43.2 35.0 100 
7 Patiashvili  N=331 23.6 40.8 35.6 100 
8 Saakashvili  N=365 24.7 43.0 32.3 100 
 
Political optimism and fears of supporters 
Perception of the present and the past situation in the country is one of the key general characteristics of the political 
orientation of citizens. For the sake of brevity it is labelled here as “political satisfaction”. The majority of 
respondents, despite their rather critical perception of the current situation, look into future with certain hope. Present 
is indeed perceived in very dark colours, in fact, by supporters of every single politician. But the difference still 
exists, and the highest proportion of dissatisfied with the current situation in the country is observed among the 
supporters of Gamkrelidze, Topadze and Natelashvili. In their turn, Zhvania, Patiashvili and Abashidze are supported 
by those who are more satisfied. 
 
Table 11 
Liking of politicians vs. satisfaction with the situation in the country 
N Politician Dissatisfied % Neutral % Satisfied % Total  % 
1 Burjanadze             
N=628 
83.4 11.3 5.3 100 
2 Abashidze            N=294 77.9 16.0 6.1 100 
3 Gamkrelidze        N=229 85.2 9.6 5.2 100 
4 Topadze              N=495 83.8 11.7 4.4 100 
5 Zhvania              N=201 80.6 11.9 7.5 100 
6 Natelashvili       N=474 83.8 11.2 5.1 100 
7 Patiashvili          N=330 83.3 10.3 6.4 100 
8 Saakashvili        N=365 83.3 10.7 6.0 100 
 
Such dissatisfaction becomes easy to understand if we look at its foundation - all respondents unanimously declare 
that currently it is impossible to lead a decent life through honest work. 
  
Table 12 
Liking of politicians vs. perceived possibility to secure decent life by the honest work 
N Politician Possible % Not possible % Difficult to say % Total 
% 
1 Burjanadze         N=635 25.0 55.4 19.5 100 
2 Abashidze          N=295 26.8 55.3 18.0 100 
3 Gamkrelidze      N=228 22.8 53.5 23.7 100 
4 Topadze            N=496 21.2 58.5 20.4 100 
5 Zhvania            N=202 24.3 60.4 15.3 100 
6 Natelashvili     N=477 24.1 61.8 14.0 100 
7 Patiashvili       N=333 24.0 59.8 16.2 100 
8 Saakashvili      N=366 24.9 58.2 16.9 100 
 
About half of respondents expressed generally optimistic view of future, notwithstanding their political preferences. 
As it will be seen elsewhere, different is actually the source of their optimism, not that much its rate. In any case, 
against the background of dire present, revealed optimism evokes the surprise and hope. Although there are many 
optimists among respondents, still their highest proportion can be found among the supporters of Burjanadze, 
Topadze and Gamkrelidze, and the smallest among the supporters of Patiashvili, Saakashvili and Abashidze. 
 
Table 13 
Liking of politicians vs. general optimism 
 Politician Mostly thing will happen as 
I would like them to % 
What I want is less 
likely to happen % 
Total 
% 
1 Burjanadze             N=626 52.7 47.3 100 
2 Abashidze               N=292 46.6 53.4 100 
3 Gamkrelidze           N=229 52.0 48.0 100 
4 Topadze                   N=490 52.4 47.6 100 
5 Zhvania                   N=200 46.0 54.0 100 
6 Natelashvili             N=471 48.2 51.8 100 
7 Patiashvili               N=327 46.2 53.8 100 
8 Saakashvili              N=363 44.6 55.4 100 
 
Against the background of such optimism, of special interest are the perceptions by respondents of the threats that the 
country may face in the coming five years. As in November 2002, in June 2003 respondents have been presented by 
a list of 11 possible dangerous developments with the request to estimate how likely these were to happen in the 
coming 5 years. As can be seen from the Table 14, the population expects in the first place the increase of diseases, 
contamination of the environment, increase in corruption and criminality, while expects the least - Russian military 
aggression (the expectation of which was particularly high in the Fall 2003 after several bombings of the Pankisi 
Gorge and various open threats expressed, and fell since), and armed ethnic and confessional conflicts. Likewise, the 
population fears less losing Georgian traditions and increase of corruption, however there is increased expectation of 
the contamination of environment, spread of diseases, and the popular riots. 
 
Table 14 
Perception of the threats Georgia may face during the next 5 years 
N Threat June % November 
% 
Difference 
% 
1 Increase of diseases (AIDS, TB, cancer, etc.) 77.1 72.5 4.6 
2 Contamination of  environment 75.0 65.0 10.0 
3 Increase in corruption 72.1 73.7 1.6+ 
4 Increase in violence and criminality 67.6 65.5 2.1 
5 Increase of poverty 69.7 71.4 1.7+ 
6 Popular riots angainst the government 64.3 62.6 1.7 
7 Spread of religious sects 59.3 59.6 0.3+ 
8 Loss of cultural traditions 56.6 65 8.4+ 
9 Religeous confllict 45.6 50.8 5.2+ 
10  Ethnic conflict 32.6 43.6 11+ 
11 Rusian military aggression 27.9 40.9 13+ 
+ In June 2003 the threat has diminished, as compared to November 2002 
 
 
Political orientation of supporters: economics and internal  policies 
Although politicians had not yet presented any consistent agenda about their policies and plans, still some key 
attitudes had been voiced, influencing the electorate and its preferences. Respectively, to significant extent the 
political choices of the population are determined by their own attitudes towards the foreign and interior politics. 
Although these attitudes are not always consistent and frequently are ambiguously defined. 
A good example of such discrepancies is the need to reform the executive government through introducing the 
cabinet of ministers instead of existing President’s Chancellery. Such approach is advocated by 32.4% of 
respondents, 18.6% thinks that no such reform is needed, while almost the half of the respondents - 49.0%, have no 
definite opinion in this regard. At the same time, respondents’ position is more clear-cut and unambiguous with 
regard to curbing presidential power - 42.3% of respondents states that it should be confined, 33.2% has no position 
and 24.5% is against the restriction. 
 The majority of respondents are against the federal territorial arrangement of the country after the restoration of 
Georgia’s territorial integrity (incorporating back Abkhazia and South Ossetia). In June 2003, according to the 
opinion of 50.7% of respondents, no region of Georgia should have the right to pursue policies independently from 
the centre. 32.3% support symmetrical federalism - in their opinion Ajara, Abkhazia, South Ossetia along with all 
other regions of Georgia should have equal rights and level of autonomy; 12.7% has expressed no opinion in this 
regard, 2.4% state that Abkhazia alone should have the special rights (more autonomy), while according to 1.9% - 
both Abkhazia and South Ossetia should enjoy special rights. 
Especially important is the ranking of priority issues that the government has to solve, made by respondents. 
Respondents were asked to choose 5 most pertinent problems out of the list of 21 issues. Obtained ranking is in line 
with the generally understood priorities for societies in transition. It is clear that solution of economic and social 
problems is an absolute  priority for the population. Among the priority issues are also the reduction of corruption, 
equality before the law and the problems of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the places of their current 
residence. At the same time, environmental problems as well as those related to foreign policy orientation are much  
less in the focus of the population. 
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Figure 2 
Priority tasks for the Georgian government 
 
It is only too natural that the supporters of different politicians rank differently the policy priorities. Such differences 
are especially obvious regarding economic issues. It is worth noting that notwithstanding such differences, the 
majority of respondents see the development of big scale industry as the priority issue, probably viewing this as a 
source of sustainable employment opportunity. Advocates of large-scale industry development can be seen more 
frequently among the supporters of Abashidze, Saakashvili and Burjanadze, while the supporters of Zhvania, 
Topadze and Patiashvili have more positive attitude towards the development of a SMEs. 
 
Table 15 
Liking of politicians and the priorities of economic development 
 Politicians  Development of the 
SMEs  % 
Development of the big 
scale enterprises  %   
Total 
% 
1 Burjanadze               N=636 33.6 66.4 100 
2 Abashidze                N=295 29.5 70.5 100 
3 Gamkrelidze            N=228 32.9 67.1 100 
4 Topadze                   N=496 34.9 65.1 100 
5 Zhvania                    N=202 37.6 62.4 100 
6 Natelashvili             N=479 33.8 66.2 100 
7 Patiashvili               N=333 33.9 66.1 100 
8 Saakashvili              N=368 31.5 68.5 100 
 
Consequences of past privatisation of enterprises present an especially sensitive issue. Here the importance of 
populist slogans and different interpretations of what social justice is are revealed in full. Significant part of 
supporters of Natelashvili, Patiashvili and Gamkrelidze think that the unfairly privatised enterprises should be re-
privatised anew, while more supporters of Topadze, Abashidze and Zhvania are against such re-privatisation. 
 
Table 16 
Liking of politicians and attitude towards re-privatisation  
N Politicians Enterprises 
should be re-
privatised % 
Enterprises 
should  not be re-
privatised  %  
Difficult to 
answer % 
Total 
% 
1 Burjanadze        N=635 67.6 8.5 23.9 100 
2 Abashidze        N=296 65.5 10.1 24.3 100 
3 Gamkrelidze    N=228 68.4 11 20.6 100 
4 Topadze           N=497 65.2 10.5 24.3 100 
5 Zhvania           N=203 68.0 9.9 22.2 100 
6 Natelashvili      N=478 72.6 8.2 19.2 100 
7 Patiashvili         N=333 69.7 9.0 21.3 100 
8 Saakashvili      N=368 67.1 9.8 23.1 100 
The estimation of the fairness of past privatisation and the need to reconsider the issue are directly linked with the 
attitude towards the governing élites, and especially the assessment of the state corruption level. A number of 
questions referred as to what extent the different branches of government acted in the interests of the country, region, 
towns or the village as compared to the preoccupation with personal or group interests.  According to the respondents 
personal and group interests motivate most of all the members of the Parliament – expressed by 91% of respondents 
(90.2% in November 2002), than President of Georgia – 80.5% (76.2% in November 2002), regional authorities – 
79.8% (75.4% in November 2002) and the least - members of local councils – 68.7% (61.3% in November 2002). 
Demonstrated unanimity in the evaluation of private interest among public servants is the indicator of the great 
deficiency of the trust toward the government, and could be qualified as its legitimacy crisis.  
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Figure 3 
Extent to which respective authorities are perceived to be motivated in their actions by personal or group interests 
Corruption is perceived by the population as one of the gravest problems of the country. Large share of the 
population  (62.1%) is convinced that the all three branches of state authority - legislative, executive and judicial are 
closely interlinked and immersed in corruption (24.2% had expressed no opinion in this respect and according to 
13.7% did not agree). At the same time many respondents have admitted that during past 6 months they were either 
demanded to give a bribe or/ and actually had given bribes. The biggest proportion of the respondents (10.4%) had to 
deliver illegal payments at healthcare facilities (In November 2002 this item was not present), 6.9% - to police (7.0% 
in 2002), 6.1% (5.2% in 2002) - at educational institutions, 5.5% (4.8% in 2002) – at the taxation office, 3% (3.9% in 
2002) to the customs officers, 1.8% (1.2% in 2002) – at gamgeoba or town hall/local council. The biggest source of 
corruption as perceived by respondents is the customs service, as indicated both in June 2002 and November 2003, 
and what is really disturbing - according to 72.3% (72.9% in November) of respondents economically the most 
profitable job position is at custom’s office.  All other agencies fall far behind in such assessment: police scored 
10.3% (9.1% in November 2002), prosecutor’s office - 7.3% (6.2% in 2002), courts and judiciary - 7.0% (7.4% in 
2002), hospitals - 3.2% (4.4% in 2002). 
 
External orientation of respondents: foreign policy   
Foreign policy issues, although less in the focus of public attention, are still quite important from the viewpoint of 
their impact on political preferences. Here some dynamic can be observed during the one year period, mainly 
reflecting the change of external environment and pressures.  
Since November 2002, the number of those, who thought that the membership in NATO and the European Union 
was very useful   for the country, has increased. Generally inclination toward Russia has decreased, while the general 
orientation toward the West has strengthened. It should be noted, that there is certain logical inconsistence between 
striving to join Euro-Atlantic structures and staying in the CIS, this probably related to the general ambiguity of the 
official position and limited awareness regarding geopolitical realities. 
So, paradoxically, in June 2003 - 44.9% (39.0% in November 2002) of respondents thought that Georgia should not 
leave CIS (according to 16.6% of these, Georgia’s participation in CIS should even increase), while only 28.5% 
(29.5% in 2002) stated that Georgia should leave CIS; 26.6% (31.5%) of respondents did not have a position. At the 
same time, much more clear-cut was the respondents’ attitude toward joining NATO and European Union - 62.0% of 
respondents (55.4% in 2002) stated that Georgia should strive to acquire NATO membership, 29.4% (31.8% in 2002) 
did not have a position, and only 8.6% (12.8%) thought that Georgia should not strive for NATO membership. Even 
more (increasingly) numerous were the supporters of Georgia’s membership in the EU - 72.2% (69.5% in November 
2002). 23.3% (24.9% in 2002) did not have an opinion and only 4.5% (5.6%) were against membership. 
Differences were revealed among the supporters of different politicians regarding varying level of confidence in their 
home country.  So, significant share of supporters of Abashidze, Patiashvili and Gamkrelidze think that Georgia’s 
fate depends more on other countries than Georgia itself; according to the supporters of Gamkrelidze, Topadze and 
Natelashvili Georgia’s fate depends equally on Georgia and other countries; while according to Abashidze, Zhvania 
and Burjanadze supporters, it depends on Georgia mostly.  
 
Table 17 
Liking of politicians vs. confidence in Georgia’s possibilities 
NNN Politician Fate of Georgia 
depends more 
on other 
countries % 
Fate of Georgia 
depends equally on 
Georgia and on 
other countries  % 
Fate of Georgia 
depends more on 
oGeorgia %  
Total 
1 Burjanadze      N=634 14.2 33.3 52.5 100 
2 Abashidze         N=295 21.4 22.7 55.9 100 
3 Gamkrelidze    N=228 17.1 37.3 45.6 100 
4 Topadze           N=495 14.7 35.6 49.7 100 
5 Zhvania            N=202 15.3 29.2 55.4 100 
6 Natelashvili      N=477 14.3 33.8 52.0 100 
7 Patiuashvili      N=332 19.0 31.6 49.4 100 
8 Saakashvili       N=367 15.8 33.2 51.0 100 
 
Respondents were presented with the list of 13 foreign states and were requested to choose from the list - three 
countries that Georgia could rely upon. The majority  (76.6%) choose USA, while much less supporters had the 
second most often chosen country - Russia (49.6%). At the same time, when respondents were forced to choose 
between USA and Russia as a focus of foreign orientation, the difference between the supporters of these two 
countries significantly decreased, once again revealing certain inconsistency of attitudes; Still, the majority - 52.9% 
(43.9% in 2002) made their choice in favour of the USA, while the remaining 47.1% (56.1% in 2002) chose Russia. 
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Figure 4 
Countries that Georgia can rely on 
USA
53%
Russia
47%
 
Figure 5 
Preference expressed by respondents to either the USA or Russia as the main foreign partners.  
Thus, there is a major division in the society between those who considers Russia as the most important foreign 
partner and those who are looking in the direction of the USA. Statistically significant difference between these two 
groups was found as related to many issues. E.g., the economic condition of the US-oriented respondents’ families 
had improved during the past 5 years. US supporters also maintain more active civil position, they think that the 
problems faced by Georgia could only be solved through active participation of ordinary citizens, more of them 
believe they could influence the government decisions, more of them plan to take part in the parliamentary elections, 
and think that what one achieves in life more depends on himself/herself than on others and on the circumstances.  
More members of this group look at the future with optimism, more of them think it possible to lead a decent life by 
honest work in today’s Georgia, and more support the idea that for the success in elections, unification of opposition 
parties is necessary. It is not at all surprising, of course, that the US supporters like President Bush, while those with 
pro-Russian orientation express preference to President Putin.  
The foreign priorities of these two groups also differ. Higher proportion of US-oriented respondents stated that 
Georgia should leave CIS, should strive to join NATO and achieve EU membership. The higher proportion of them 
also had justified the US intervention in Iraq, and the support of this intervention by the Georgian government. More 
of them also opted for the closure of Russian military bases in Georgia, and were against the prolongation of the 
mandate of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia.   
The differences in foreign orientations of respondents got reflected in their political preferences – orientation on 
Russia was chosen by supporters of Abashidze, Patiashvili and Saakashvili, while US-oriented respondents preferred 
of Gamkrelidze, Topadze and Natelashvili. 
 
Table 18 
Liking of politicians vs. foreign orientation 
 Politician Priority - relationship with Russia 
% 
Priority - relationship with USA  
%  
Total 
1 Burjanadze          N=626 45.7 54.3 100 
2 Abashidze           N=295 55.6 44.4 100 
3 Gamkrelidze       N=223 43.5 56.5 100 
4 Topadze             N=490 43.9 56.1 100 
5 Zhvania               N=201 45.8 54.2 100 
6 Natelashvili         N=471 45.4 54.6 100 
7 Patiashvili           N=328 54.3 45.7 100 
8 Saakashvili         N=364 46.7 53.3 100 
 
These differences were also reflected through the assessment by respondents of the military operation in Iraq – most 
of all it was justified by the supporters of Gamkrelidze, Zhvania and Saakashvili, and it was the least accepted by the 
supporters of Patiashvili, Abashidze and Natelashvili. 
 
Table 19 
Liking of politicians and the attitude toward military operation in Iraq 
N Politician Justify the operation 
% 
Do not justify  %  Difficult to answer  % Total 
1 Burjanadze     N=635 41.1 31.7 27.2 100 
2 Abashidze        N=294 37.4 39.8 22.8 100 
3 Gamkrelidze   N=229 49.3 25.8 24.9 100 
4 Topadze          N=494 42.5 34.2 23.3 100 
5 Zhvania           N=202 48.5 28.7 22.8 100 
6 Natelashvili    N=477 39.6 37.1 23.3 100 
7 Patiashvili      N=333 37.2 41.4 21.3 100 
8 Saakashvili     N=366 45.6 30.3 24.0 100 
 
The fate of Russian military bases in Georgia still remains a sensitive issue. The most critical attitude toward Russian 
bases was expressed by supporters of Gamkrelidze, Natelashvili and Zhvania, the most positive – by supporters of 
Abashidze, Patiashvili and, paradoxically, again Zhvania; the most numerous undetermined respondents were among 
the supporters of Topadze, Abashidze and Patiashvili. All in all, the absolute majority of the respondents, 63.3% 
(60.7% in 2002) states that in the next 5 years all Russian military bases located in Georgia should be closed; 23.9% 
(22.6% in 2002) does not have a position, and 12.8% (16.8% in 2002) is against the closure of the bases. It is 
interesting to note that the bigger proportion of urban respondents (67.2%) as compared to rural ones (58.2%) 
supports the closure. The position is also somewhat different between the poor and the non-poor. Higher proportion 
of  the non-poor (64.8%) than the poor (35.2%) want the bases to be closed down. Again, the difference between the 
age groups is insignificant. 
 
Table 20 
Liking of politicians and attitude towards the closure of Russian military bases 
N Politician Bases should be 
closed % 
Bases should  not 
be closed  %  
Difficult to 
answer % 
Total 
1 Burjaandze        N=634 68.5 12.5 19.1 100 
2 Abashidze           N=295 54.6 22.7 22.7 100 
3 Gamkrelidze      N=228 73.2 11.8 14.9 100 
4 Topadze              N=495 65.5 11.7 22.8 100 
5 Zhvania              N=202 68.3 14.9 16.8 100 
6 Natelashvili      N=476 69.1 12.0 18.9 100 
7 Patiashvili         N=334 62.0 17.4 20.7 100 
8 Saakashvili         N=365 65.2 14.8 20.0 100 
Not less problematic is the issue of military assistance. In general there is a positive attitude towards American and 
Turkish military assistance. 87.0% (82.3% in November) reveals positive attitude towards operating in the country 
now American military assistance program, 13.0% (19.7% in November) evaluates it negatively. Slightly small 
number, 66.9% (62.6% in November) reveals positive attitude towards Turkish assistance. American assistance is 
more favoured in towns (86.8%) than in countryside (80.3%). The difference is also observed between poor and non-
poor. The bigger proportion of non-poor (66.2%) than poor (33.8%) evaluates it positively. The more is difference in 
evaluation Turkish military assistance. It is also more positively looked at in towns (70.0%) than in countryside 
(62.8%). 
Most positively the US assistance is evaluated by the supporters of Zhvania, Saakashvili and Gamkrelidze, most 
negatively by the supporters of Patiashvili, Abashidze and Burjanadze.  
 
Table 21 
Liking of politicians and the attitude towards US military assistance 
N Politician Positive % Negative % Difficult to say % Total % 
1 Burjanadze        N=635 85.7 9.6 4.7 100 
2 Abashidze         N=294 79.9 11.9 8.2 100 
3 Gamkrelidze      N=227 86.8 7.9 5.3 100 
4 Topadze             N=496 86.3 8.7 5.0 100 
5 Zhvania             N=202 92.1 5.0 3.0 100 
6 Natelashvili       N=477 86.8 8.4 4.8 100 
7 Patiashvili         N=330 80.9 13.3 5.8 100 
8 Saakashvili       N=364 87.6 8.2 4.1 100 
 
Whom the population of Georgia knows and whom it does not know 
It is worth noting that the population knows much better those politicians who lead bigger political parties or are MPs 
than the representatives of the executive power, even such as Deputy State Minister Akaki Zoidze, who is virtually 
unknown to the majority of respondents. Below are ranked various political figures by their public visibility, i.e. by 
how well are their names known by respondents. 
 
Table 22 
Ranking of politicians by the level of public recognition 
 Politician Do not know who is he/she % 
1 Akaki Zoidze 53.9 
2 Vitali Khazaradze 14.5 
3 David Gamkrelidze 13.2 
4 Igor Giorgadze 11.8 
5 Vazha Lordkipanidze 11 
6 Levan Gachehiladze 9.9 
7 Irakli Batiashvili 9.5 
8 Guram Sharadze 9.3 
9 Giorgi Baramidze 8.5 
10 Mikhail Machavariani 8.4 
11 Akaki Asatiani 7.3 
12 Temur Shashiashvili 7.0 
13 Gogi Topadze 5.7 
14 Vakhtang Rcheul;ishvili 5.1 
15 Irina Sarishvili 4.3 
16 Shalva Natelashvili 4.3 
17 Jumber Patiashvili 3.8 
18 Avtandil Jorbenadze 3.8 
19 Aslan Abashidze 3.7 
20 Mikhail Saakashvili 3.4 
21 Zurab Zhvania 3.0 
22 Nino Burjanadze 2.1 
23 Eduard Shevardnadze 1.6 
 
At the same time it seems interesting to compare the public visibility of politicians with that of other public figures, 
among whom were listed some representatives of executive power, as well as MP and businessman Gogi Topadze 
who has a multiple public image. 
 
Table 23 
Ranking of public figures by their recognition by respondents 
 Public figure Do not know who (s)he  is % 
1 Ghia Nodia 58.4 
2 Guram Akhvlediani 56.2 
3 Zaza Okuashvili 52.9 
4 Zurab Tkemaladze 41.1 
5 Giga Bokeria 38.3 
6 Bidzina Ivanishvili 37.6 
7 Tedo Japaridze 32.6 
8 Levan Berdzenishvili 32.5 
9 Mamuka Khazaradze 30.7 
10 Vano Chkhartishvili 24.6 
11 Ghia Jokhtaberidze 24.4 
12 Ghia Chanturai 22.2 
13 Nugzar Shevardnadze 18.4 
14 Temur Chkonia 17.8 
15 Akaki Gogichaishvili 16.3 
16 Roin Metreveli  14.3 
17 Eka Khoperia 11.9 
18 Niko Lekishvili 11.3 
19 Irakli Menagarishvili 9.5 
20 Koba Narchemashvili 8.2 
21 Badri Patarkatsishvili 8 
22 Gogi Topadze 5.5 
23 Ilia II (Shiolashvili) 2.4 
 
Also, respondents were requested to evaluate above listed 23 public figures according to their positive contribution to 
the well being of the nation.  The Catholikos of the Georgian Orthodox Church Ilia II heads the list, followed by 
Gogi Topadze, while the President’s nephew and businessman Nugzar Shevardnadze is at the bottom, preceded by 
the father-in-law of the President’s son, businessman Guram Akhvlediani. It is also worth paying attention to the fact 
that among the top ten public figures, there are are five businessmen (one more – Tchanturia - heads GIOC, 
Georgian International Oil Company) and two are TV hosts. 
 
Table 25 
Assessment by respondents of contribution by public figures 
(excluding those, who did not know the given person) 
Rank Public figure Has done 
much good 
for the nation  
% 
Difficult to say % Has not done 
good for the 
nation  % 
Total  
% 
1 Ilia II 74 19.5 6.4 100 
2 Gogi Topadze 72.9 22.2 4.9 100 
3 Bidzina Ivanishvili 63.5 29.1 7.4 100 
4 Akaki Gogichaishvili 59.1 31.8 9.1 100 
5 Eka Khoperia 57.5 32.7 9.7 100 
6 Badri Patarkatsishvili 52.7 36.9 10.4 100 
7 Temur Chkonia 43.2 38 18.7 100 
8 Ghia Chanturia 41.8 40.7 17.5 100 
9 Mamuka Khazaradze 32.2 48 19.8 100 
10 Levan Berdzenishvili 28.2 52.9 19 100 
11 Roin Metreveli 27 40.2 32.7 100 
12 Zurab Tkemaladze 26.5 52.5 21 100 
13 Ghia Jokhtaberidze 24.3 37.5 38.2 100 
14 Zaza Okuashvili 23.6 47 29.4 100 
15 Niko Lekishvili 22.4 48.8 28.8 100 
16 Irakli Menagarashvili 22.2 51.9 25.9 100 
17 Tedo Japaridze 20.4 51.7 27.9 100 
18 Ghia Nodia 18.4 53.2 28.4 100 
19 Koba Narchemashvili 19.7 46.5 33.8 100 
20 Giga Bokeria 17.8 45.2 37.1 100 
21 Vano Chkhartishvili 11.1 41.8 47.1 100 
22 Guram Akhvlediani 10.7 58.2 31.1 100 
23 Nugzar Shevardnadze 8.4 33.3 58.4 100 
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Figure 6 
Ten public figures with the highest approval rate 
 
Presidents today and tomorrow 
The June, 2003 survey unequivocally indicated that the political leadership of Georgia gradually loses the trust of the 
population.  
Respondents were asked to express their attitude toward the presidents of five countries (Azerbaijan, USA, Armenia, 
Russia and Georgia) and also Georgian politicians with prospect of being elected for the presidency. Naturally, 
respondents did not know all the presidents equally well – 3.5% did not know who was Shevardnadze (sic!), 7.8% -  
Putin, 9.6% - Bush, 32.2% - Aliev and 38.1% - Kocharian. It should be noted that since November 2002 public 
opinion regarding presidents has formed more clearly, and they were better known. Primarily this concerns 
Armenia’s President Kocharian (in November 2002 46.2% had nothing to say on him), probably attributed to the 
recent Presidential elections in Armenia and its coverage in the media, as well as Kocharian’s visit to Tbilisi. The 
number of respondents who did not have opinion also fell in cases of Bush (from 14% to 9.6%), Aliev (from 4.6% to 
3.5%), Putin (from 9.0% to 7.8%) and Shevardnadze (from 14.0% to 9.6%).  The attitude has changed significantly 
in cases of Shevardnadze (liked on 2003 by 7.0% less respondents than in 2002), and Putin (popularity increased by 
5.0% of respondents). The champion among presidents was Bush (liked by 43.0% in June 2003 and 44.9% in 2002),  
followed by Aliev (24.2% in June 2003 and 22.7% in 2003), then Putin (25.8% in 2003 and  20.9% in 2002), 
followed by Kocharian (14.2% in 2002 and 14.6% in 2002),and only then at the end  was Shevardnadze (13.8% in 
June 2003 vs. 20.8% in November, 2003), whose popularity had dropped very significantly during the period 
between surveys.  
Table 26 
Attitude toward the presidents of five countries 
N President Mostly like  % Neutral  % Do not like % Total  % 
  November 
2002 
June 
2003 
November 
2002 
June 
2003 
November 
2002 
June 
2003 
November
2002 
June 
2003 
1 George W. 
Bush 
44.9 43 32.7 37.5 22.4 19.5 100 100 
2 Heidar Aliev 22.7 24.2 36 44.7 41.3 31.2 100  100  
3 Vladimir Putin 20.9 25.8 35.8 33.8 43.3 40.3 100  100  
4 Eduard 
Shevardnadze 
20.8 13.8 20 29.4 59.2 56.7 100  100  
5 Robert 
Kocharian 
14.6  14.2 31.9 43.7 53.5 42.1 100  100  
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Figure 6 
Popularity of the presidents 
In less than two years the Georgia’s population will have to elect a new president, hence it is due time to consider 
possible candidates. In June 2003 the most favourable positions had three politicians - Mikhail Saakashvili, Shalva 
Natelashvili and Nino Burjanadze. It is important to pay attention to the difference between those, whom respondents 
believe will become elected as president of the country, and whom they personally wish to be elected as such (but 
possibly do not consider this realistic). Such discrepancy was best revealed in cases of Mikhail Saakashvili and Nino 
Burjanadze, although in different directions: more respondents wanted Burjanadze to become the president, while the 
less believed this will happen; Saakashvili, on the contrary, was wanted by less respondents, but more were 
convinced that he will be elected. Difference is also significant in the case of the incumbent president Shevardnadze, 
who is prohibited by the constitution to be elected any more – still, 13.0% of respondents expect this to happen. In 
cases of Natelashvili, Burjanadze and Patiashvili the numbers of their “supporters” is higher than of “believers”, 
while in cases of Saakashvili, Shevardnadze and Zhvania the opposite tendency is evident. Such differences stem 
probably from the perception of their political skills and career potential as compared to other positive qualities. 
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Figure 7 
Politicians expected to become or preferred as future presidents 
 
 
Political parties and the parliamentary elections 
The November 2, 2003, Parliamentary elections evoke a big deal of interest among the population. The majority of 
respondents – 60.3%, intends to take part in elections (20.5% had not made the decision by the time of the survey, 
19.3% did  not intend to vote). The readiness to participate is higher among the rural (65.2%) than urban (56.7%) 
respondents, while the difference between the groups with different economic status and age is not significant. 
The main criteria for the evaluation of the attractiveness of a political party for the majority of 42.4% was the record 
of past achievements of the party in question, for 24.4% it was the party programme and agenda, for 15.6% - 
personal attitude toward the party leader(s), for 7.5% - personal attitude towards some party members, for 5.9%  -
public speeches of party speakers, for 4.1% - other factors. 
In June 2003, answering the question as to for which party they would vote if the elections were to be hold that day, 
46.3% stated they had not decided as yet; 25.5% declared that would not vote for any party; 10.3% would render 
their vote for the Labour party, 4.2% - for the Revival, 4.1% - for National Movement, 3.1% - for the New Rights, 
2.6%  - for the Citizen’s Union, 1.5% for United Democrats (NB - formation of party blocks and the unification of 
Burjanadze and Democrats took place after the June survey). As to which party or block would obtain the majority of 
seats in November 2 elections, the majority of respondents (51.2%) could not answer the question. In the opinion of 
12.4% Labour party will win the elections, of 11.4% - the Citizen’s Union, 8.4%  - National Movement, 5.1%  - the 
Revival. Especially meaningful is the difference between the preferences and expected outcomes regard the Citizens 
Union, pointing to certain political fatalism and to the importance that the population ascribe to so called 
“administrative resource” (exploiting opportunities available to the ruling elite) in elections.  Also is worth noting 
that almost half of respondents (49.2%) expect the results of the elections to be rigged (39.4% had no position on this 
issue, 11.3% expected the elections to be held fair). 
The urban and rural respondents, as well as the representatives of different age groups do not differ in their support of 
different parties. On the other hand, significant differences are found between the poor and the non-poor. 
 
Table 
Political parties whom respondents expected, and whom they wanted to win elections 
N Parties Expect to win % Will vote for % 
1 Labour Party 12.4 10.3 
2 Citizen’s Union 11.4 2.6 
3 National Movement 8.4 4.1 
4 Revival 5.1 4.2 
5 New Rights 4.1 3.1 
6 For New Georgia 2.8 0.6 
7 United Democrats 3.6 1.5 
8 Undustry will save Georgia 0.5 0.6 
9 Socialist Party 0.2 0 
10 Unity 0.1 0.3 
11 Traditionalist Party 0.1 0.2 
12 People’s Party 0.1 0.1 
13 Christian-Democratic Union of Georgia 0 0.4 
14 Communist Party 0 0.2 
15 Strong Svaneti 0 0.2 
16 “Mdzleveli” (Victorious) 0 0.1 
17 Georgian League 0 0.1 
18 Ilia Chavchavadzed Society 0 0.1 
19 Cannot answer 51.2 46.3 
20 Nobody  25 
 Total 100 100 
 
Conclussions 
Despite the fact, that political landscape is rapidly changing, the attitude of population towards important political 
issues changes much  slower. It is possible to distiguish three main groups of factors that influence the political 
preferences of the public: social status, external orientation (Russia/West), and the personality characteristics. 
Social and economic profile: Rural-urban, education, self-assessment of economic status. 
Such politicians, as Zurab Zhvania, Gogi Topadze, David Gamkrelidze, Nino Burjanadze are mainly supported by 
urban population, people with the university education and with relatively high income. 
At the same time supporters  of Jumber Patiashvili, Mikheil Saakashvili, Aslan Abashidze and Shalva Natelashvili 
first of all belong to rural population, with lower educational level and low income. Although there are some 
surprises as well – Gamkrelidze is also relatively popular among the poor, Saakashvili - among the non-poor. 
External orientation. Relying on Russia or on the USA/West. Respective variables include the assessment of the 
military operations in Iraq, US military assistance to Georgia, attitude towards the closure of Russian military bases, 
and the direct choice between Russia and USA. 
The most significant trend observed is the increase of the orientation towards the West. Respectively, the most pro-
American are supporters of Gamkrelidze, but also supporters of Zhvania, Natelashvili, Saakashvili, as well as some 
of Topadze supporters. Clearly pro-Russian orientation is found among the supporters of Abashidze and Patiashvili. 
Burjanadze supporters orient more toward the US, but they also do not ignore the importance of Russia. 
Personality features. E.g. - optimism. Supporters of Burjanadze, Topadze and Gamkrelidze look at the life with more 
hope and optimism, are more ready to take the responsibility for it in their hands; Among the supporters of 
Patiashvili, Saakashvili and Natelashvili there are more socially passive, relying on external involvement, they have 
less hope and optimism. 
 
